Prevent path traversal in git resolver pathInRepo parameter

fix: prevent path traversal in git resolver pathInRepo parameter
Prevent path traversal in git resolver pathInRepo parameterec7755-fix-prevent-path-traversal-in-git-resolver-cve-2026-33211fixprevent path traversal git resolver pathinrepo

Committed by vdemeester

commit message
fix: prevent path traversal in git resolver pathInRepo parameter

The git resolver's pathInRepo parameter was not validated for path
traversal, allowing a tenant to read arbitrary files from the resolver
pod's filesystem by supplying paths like '../../../../etc/passwd' or
'../../../../var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token'.
 
The resolved file contents were then written into
resolutionrequest.status.data (base64-encoded), creating an
exfiltration channel. Since the resolver pod's ServiceAccount typically
has broad RBAC permissions (including read access to secrets), this
could lead to full privilege escalation.
 
The fix adds two layers of defense:
 
1. Validate pathInRepo in PopulateDefaultParams() to reject paths
   containing '..' components. Leading slashes are stripped for
   backwards compatibility (filepath.Join already handles them safely).
 
2. Switch getFileContent() to use 'git show HEAD:<path>' to read files
   from git's object store instead of os.ReadFile from the filesystem.
   Symlinks are resolved via filepath.EvalSymlinks before computing the
   relative path for git show, so in-repo symlinks work correctly while
   escape symlinks produce paths that git show rejects.
 
Unit and e2e regression tests are added for traversal patterns,
symlink escapes, and valid leading-slash paths.
 
The vulnerability was introduced in commit 318006c4e3a5 when the git
resolver switched from go-git's in-memory filesystem (memfs) to
shelling out to git and reading files with os.ReadFile(). All releases
from v1.0.0 through v1.10.0 are affected.
 
Fixes: GHSA-j5q5-j9gm-2w5c

Editor assessment

This commit patches CVE-2026-33211. The message earns its grade through precision: a subject that localizes the flaw to pathInRepo, a body demonstrating the traversal and explaining the exfiltration route through resolutionrequest status data, and a clear statement of why the resolver's service-account permissions elevate this to full escalation. Remediation is described as two independent layers - validation in PopulateDefaultParams where leading slashes are stripped for backwards compatibility, and git show reads against the object store with symlink resolution. Unit and e2e regression tests for traversal, symlink escape and valid paths are cited. The origin commit, affected range and GHSA footer finish a thorough write-up.

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